Proposed U.S. Legislation and Policy in Central America, Recent Past and Present

Vice President Kamala Harris’ Call to Action

May 27, 2021

​​In her role overseeing diplomatic efforts within El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”), and with Mexico, Vice President Kamala Harris announced today a Call to Action for businesses and social enterprises to make new, significant commitments to help send a signal of hope to the people of the region and sustainably address the root causes of migration by promoting economic opportunity. As part of this Call to Action launch, 12 companies and organizations announced commitments to support inclusive economic development in the Northern Triangle, including: Accion, Bancolombia, Chobani, Davivienda, Duolingo, the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Mastercard, Microsoft, Nespresso, Pro Mujer, the Tent Partnership for Refugees, and the World Economic Forum.

Our comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of migration will involve significant commitments of U.S. government resources to support the long-term development of the region—including efforts to foster economic opportunity, strengthen governance, combat corruption, and improve security. This approach will leverage commitments and resources from the governments in the Northern Triangle, as well as partnerships with multilateral development banks and international financial institutions.

Supporting the long-term development of the region, and in the Western Hemisphere more broadly, will require more than just the resources of the U.S. government. For this reason, Vice President Harris is calling on the private sector to draw on its unique resources and expertise to make commitments to support inclusive economic growth in the Northern Triangle. Together, we can work to overcome obstacles to investment, promote economic opportunity, and support long-term development in the region.  The Administration looks forward to increased collaboration with private companies—U.S., foreign, and local in the Northern Triangle and Latin America more broadly—to build upon this Call to Action in the months and years to come. 

U.S. Government Long-Term Commitments and Call to Action Focus Areas
This Call to Action is one component under the U.S. government’s comprehensive, long-term strategy to address barriers to investment and to promote economic opportunity in the Northern Triangle. Just as government action alone will not be enough to achieve meaningful outcomes, private sector commitments will be facilitated and supported by strong U.S. government initiatives to address longstanding impediments to investment-led growth. Under our broader strategy, near-term private sector commitments will be mutually reinforced by sustained U.S. government efforts to foster a business-enabling environment, increased private sector investment, and sustainable economic growth and opportunity. As part of the broader strategy, this Call to Action aims to generate new commitments from businesses and social enterprises in six focus areas with an emphasis on supporting vulnerable populations, including women and youth, in the Northern Triangle region. These focus areas include:

  • Reform Agenda – Commitments to support greater transparency, predictability, and stability in the business enabling environment by facilitating regional government efforts to adopt international best practices in licensing, permitting, procurement, regulation, and taxation.

  • Digital and Financial Inclusion – Commitments to expand affordable internet access and participation in the digital economy; facilitate access to financial technologies and capital for small businesses, particularly women- and indigenous-owned businesses; and ensure that the most vulnerable and the most likely to migrate have access to basic public services and financial institutions.

  • Food Security and Climate-smart Agriculture – Commitments to combat food shortages by increasing agricultural productivity and crop resilience.

  • Climate Adaptation and Clean Energy – Commitments to support the region’s resilience to climate change through adaptation and mitigation efforts; support industries impacted by climate change; and transition to clean energy.

  • Education and Workforce Development – Commitments to expand job-training programs; support greater access to technical and secondary education; and create higher paying formal sector jobs, especially for women and in rural areas.

  • Public Health Access – Commitments to support regional governments in addressing the impact of COVID-19 on their populations; build robust and resilient health economies to confront future health challenges; support access to clean water and sanitation; and ensure inclusive access to healthcare. 

The State Department, in coordination with the Partnership for Central America, will manage follow-up to this Call to Action, which will involve:

  • Connecting businesses with relevant U.S. interagency partners, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, among others; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); multilateral development banks; UN agencies, other international organizations; and relevant government officials from the region to facilitate potential new partnerships and commitments;

  • Coordinating private sector partners to ensure sustained progress through strategic and high-impact initiatives aligned to social impact goals, and facilitating joint ventures between new and existing partners across global public, private, and social sectors;

  • Offering feedback on potential private sector initiatives, based on an assessment of potential migrants’ needs in the region;

  • Working with partner governments and institutions to promote reforms that address impediments to investment and foster a business-enabling environment;

  • Establishing metrics to measure the impact of commitments made in response to the Call to Action, to track program effectiveness and identify key trends across key economic and social impact metrics; and

  • Convening public forums and facilitating discussions on challenges, trends, and progress toward aspired social impact goals.

The Partnership for Central America is a non-profit organization that was developed in support of the Vice President’s Call to Action. The Partnership aims to coordinate practical solutions to advance economic opportunity, address urgent climate, education and health challenges, and promote long-term investments and workforce capability in support a vision of hope for Central America.

The Administration and the Partnership welcome additional commitments to join this initiative and promote economic opportunity in the Northern Triangle. Vice President Harris invites interested parties to get involved by contacting the State Department Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at jointhecall@state.gov. In addition, the Partnership for Central America can be reached at support@centampartnership.org.

Founding Participants in the Call to Action

The following 12 companies and organizations join the Vice President today in supporting the Administration’s Call to Action. All are also founding members of the Partnership.

These companies and organizations put forth summaries of their work to date and new initiatives to invest in the Northern Triangle, as follows:

  • Founded in 1961, Accion is a global nonprofit working to advance economic opportunity through microfinance and impact investing. Accion works with financial service providers across Latin America that are expanding the reach, quality, and affordability of financial services for low-income and underserved people. Over the next three years, Accion will provide advice, guidance, and consulting services to organizations that serve micro and small business owners in the Northern Triangle region, ultimately benefitting more than 400,000 people. Accion aims to connect small business owners to new markets and grow their businesses by improving their management, financial, and digital capabilities.  Accion will help businesses shift from cash to digital, while expanding local access to finance through branchless banking. The effort aims to reduce barriers that have prevented women from accessing economic opportunities and boost the productivity of small-holder farmers. Accion will enable lenders that already serve the poor to make greater use of technology to reach more clients, supporting them more effectively and with greater security. Ultimately, Accion’s work will empower business owners and their families to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as build the financial health, resilience, and prosperity sorely needed to address the root causes of migration.

  • Grupo Bancolombia is one of Latin America’s major financial institutions with operations in El Salvador and Guatemala. To further its commitment to sustainable development in Central America, Grupo Bancolombia will commit to expanding its financial inclusion efforts to reach the Northern Triangle’s unbanked and vulnerable populations through digital banking accounts, focusing on remittance-receiving families, women-led businesses and other small enterprises to increase investment and improve living conditions, and strengthen ties to their local communities, adding more than 400,000 new account holders by 2025. As part of this work, Grupo Bancolombia will work with its partners to expand access to credit and connect more than 50,000 small shopkeepers with suppliers, distributors and retail customers.

  • Chobani’s mission is to make delicious, nutritious, and natural food for all people because access to good food is a right – not a privilege. Chobani will now extend its impact to the Northern Triangle and bring its incubator program to Guatemala, where local food entrepreneurs will get expertise and support to help them set up and scale their operations. Chobani will use knowledge from its global incubator program to determine how to best create and execute a program in Guatemala that will support local startups and contribute to regional economic empowerment. In the U.S., the Chobani Incubator has helped support the growth of 47 different companies in the food and beverage industry since its inception in 2016. Founders are given a monetary grant and have access to resources across the ecosystem, from retailers to investors and everything in between. The Incubator has also run programs internationally in both Australia and Turkey. Each program has its own unique operating model, but all serve Chobani’s mission of bringing better food to more people.

  • Davivienda is a multi-national, Colombian bank with a presence in the United States, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama. To date, Davivienda has worked to expand financial inclusion by expanding its digital payment system, DAVIPLATA, and by increasing access to credit, particularly for women.  In Colombia, Davivienda has connected nearly 13 million individuals to its digital services, 5 million of whom were previously unbanked. As part of this Call to Action, in collaboration with public and private sector partners, Davivienda will commit to connecting 1 million unbanked individuals in the Northern Triangle with financial services, including via its DAVIPLATA platform. Davivienda will also commit to contributing $500 million in loans to support low-income housing, small- and medium-sized businesses, renewable energy projects, and women entrepreneurs.

  • Duolingo is an education app with over 500 million downloads. In the Northern Triangle, the app is used by over 500,000 people to learn English in order to improve their education and job prospects. Duolingo will commit to ensuring that its content remains free so that everyone has access to high-quality education through mobile devices. The company recently created Duolingo ABC, an app designed to teach early literacy skills to children. In order to reduce high levels of illiteracy in the Northern Triangle, Duolingo will commit to developing Duolingo ABC in Spanish. Duolingo will also commit to providing fee waivers for the Duolingo English Test to high-achieving, low-income students to reduce barriers to higher education. Combined, these efforts will expand access to education in the region through the use of technology, helping to improve people’s livelihoods and prospects for a better future.

  • Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health brings together dedicated experts from multiple disciplines to produce powerful change to improve the lives and health of people around the globe. The Harvard Chan School will commit to adding an evidence-based lens by harnessing scientific data to maximize capacity to measure and report systems-wide impact of the partnership; improve access to health care; and train and enable workers to manage pipeline healthcare issues in the Northern Triangle. Harnessing qualitative and quantitative metrics, the School will provide partners and managers with the means to pilot and scale activities that support data-sharing in order to foster transformative change across all communities, platforms, and sectors. 

  • Through its work in financial inclusion, Mastercard has brought over 500 million individuals globally into the digital economy. In collaboration with public and private sector partners, the company aims to bring 5 million people in the Northern Triangle into the financial system and digitalize 1 million micro and small businesses, leveraging its innovation and technology to improve access to vital services and drive inclusive economic growth. This includes enabling individuals to pay and get paid digitally, securely, and efficiently, and reaching previously underserved communities with technology that works on mobile phones and in rural, low-connectivity areas. Mastercard can also provide marginalized individuals with access to services like healthcare and agricultural marketplaces, and help small businesses grow with affordable tools and services. With access to financial and digital tools, and the ability to use them, Mastercard can help close the digital divide and improve livelihoods for generations to come.

  • Microsoft’s purpose is to ensure that technology helps promote inclusive opportunity, protects fundamental rights, and supports a sustainable future. Microsoft will build on its long-standing presence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to bring connectivity, skills, and greater opportunity to their citizens. First, with local partners including Albavision, Microsoft will expand internet access to up to 3 million people in the region by July 2022, as part of the Microsoft Airband Initiative. Microsoft will also expand its work with partner New Sun Road to establish community centers to provide internet, digital skills, devices, educational experiences and mentorship to women and youth in rural and high-migration areas. Second, Microsoft will build on its global skills initiative to provide access to digital skills learning paths to connect people to skills and certifications. Third, Microsoft is investing in technology to increase the transparency and accountability of government spending, and exploring the use of data science to evaluate the efficacy of interventions to address community needs.

  • By working directly with over 120,000 coffee farmers in 15 countries, Nespresso, which offers high quality portioned coffee to consumers, unlocks the potential of coffee for producers through its unique sustainable quality coffee sourcing approach by addressing the key social, economic and environmental challenges they face with practical solutions, focusing on improving yields and quality to drive revenues, paying higher prices for high quality coffee and driving activities to improve livelihoods, providing free agronomy support, promoting human rights protection and gender equality, and building resilience to climate change through regenerative agricultural practices and agroforestry. Nespresso is committed to improving livelihoods in the Northern Triangle by expanding its existing sourcing activities in Guatemala, and by starting to source quality coffees from El Salvador and Honduras from this year on, creating new economic opportunities for smallholder farmers and replicating the social and environmental impact of Nespresso’s programs in more communities. The company aims to support the local economy with a minimum of $150 million spent across coffee purchases, price premiums and technical assistance by 2025, more than doubling both the number of coffee farms it works with and total coffee volumes.

  • For over 30 years, Pro Mujer has been driving inclusive economic opportunities for women in Latin America by providing millions of families with access to finance, healthcare services, entrepreneurship support, and digital inclusion. Pro Mujer will commit to reaching three million people in the Northern Triangle by bringing these services directly, and with the collaboration of local partners, to vulnerable communities, including low income families, rural and indigenous populations. In addition, Pro Mujer will commit to structuring and launching blended finance vehicles that provide capital, technical assistance and capacity building support to micro, small and medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in the Northern Triangle. This critical support to MSMEs and the services Pro Mujer intends to bring to individuals and families will together have a transformative effect on these communities and directly address the root causes of migration from the region.   

  • The Tent Partnership for Refugees mobilizes the business community to improve the lives and livelihoods of refugees displaced from their home countries. Tent pledges to share best practices and lessons learned with the Partnership for Central America from working with its network of over 150 major businesses to implement commitments in support of refugees around the world. In addition, Tent will leverage its business network to raise awareness of the root causes of migration and how companies can help improve conditions in Central America, for example by supporting education outcomes, creating jobs and entrepreneurship opportunities in the region, as well as sourcing more products from the Northern Triangle.

  • The Forum has been actively engaged in Latin America for decades, developing and supporting the implementation of a strategic agenda to address the region’s most pressing challenges and ensuring a robust participation of leaders in its various projects, activities and events. In response to this Call to Action, the World Economic Forum will convene a network of committed actors over time, with a special focus on the role that long-term, sustainable investment can play in transforming the lives and well-being of citizens throughout the area. To do so, the Forum would facilitate collaboration between governments, civil society, business, development institutions and others, to address the root causes of migration and for the Northern Triangle countries to realize their potential towards sustainable and inclusive growth and for quality job creation. 

Berta Cáceres Human Rights in Honduras Act

May 27, 2021

First introduced in 2016 by Rep. Hank Johnson and named after the murdered Indigenous activist, Berta Cáceres, the bill sought to suspend U.S. funding for police and military operations, and prohibit international loans providing security assistance from being dispersed unless the Honduran government investigates and prosecutes blatant human rights violations by their police and military forces. The bill was reintroduced by Rep. Johnson and in total, received support from over 60 Congress representatives. 

117th CONGRESS

1st Session (2021-2022)

H. R. 1574 

To suspend United States security assistance with Honduras until such time as human rights violations by Honduran security forces cease and their perpetrators are brought to justice.

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
                             March 3, 2021

Mr. Johnson of Georgia (for himself, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Kaptur, Ms. Omar, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Mr. Castro of Texas, Mr. Beyer, Mr. Blumenauer, Ms. Bonamici, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Cleaver, Mr. Danny K. Davis of Illinois, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Espaillat, Ms. Eshoo, Ms. Garcia of Texas, Ms. Scanlon, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. Norton, Mr. Huffman, Ms. Jayapal,  Mr. Khanna, Mr. Kind, Mr. Kilmer, Mr. Levin of Michigan, Mr. Lowenthal, Mr. Lynch, Mr. McGovern, Ms. Moore of Wisconsin, Mr. Moulton, Mrs. Napolitano, Ms. Ocasio-Cortez, Mr. Panetta, Ms. Pingree, Mr. Pocan, Ms. Pressley, Mr. Raskin, Miss Rice of New York, Mr. Rush, Ms. Tlaib, Mr. Tonko, Ms. Velazquez, Mrs. Watson Coleman, Mr. Vargas, and Mr. Welch)  introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

                                 A BILL

To suspend United States security assistance with Honduras until such time as human rights violations by Honduran security forces cease and their perpetrators are brought to justice.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Berta Caceres Human Rights in Honduras Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Honduran military and police are widely established to be deeply corrupt and commit human rights abuses, including torture, rape, illegal detention, and murder, with impunity.

(2) The New York Times revealed documents on April 15, 2016, indicating that top officials of the Honduran police ordered the killings of drug-crime investigators Julian Aristides Gonzales and Alfredo Landaverde in 2009 and 2011, respectively, with the subsequent knowledge of top police and, evidently, high-ranking government officials. The Times suggested in a subsequent article that the revelations were being manipulated by the President of Honduras for his own corrupt purposes. Both cases remain in impunity.

(3) Individuals in the military and police with documented records of having committed gross human rights abuses with  impunity continue to serve in, and be appointed and reappointed to high positions with state security forces. Former Army  general in the Armed Forces Julian Pacheco Tinoco, the Minister of Security, was the highest ranking official in charge of the repression of protesters by the police following the November 27, 2017, election, and has been twice named in United States Federal court as overseeing drug trafficking. He was reappointed to his position by President Juan Orlando Hernandez in December 2018.

(4) Other individuals who previously served in high-ranking positions and who are documented to have committed gross human  rights abuses continue in impunity. In January 2021, United States Federal prosecutors filed new motions with the Department of Justice in the Southern District of New York that implicate senior military, police, political, and business figures in laundering money, bribery, and murder, including former head of National Police, Juan Carlos ``El Tigre'” Bonilla Valladares.

(5) International human rights bodies have reported that the Honduran military and police commit human rights abuses, including killings, with impunity. The Associated Press has documented death squad activity by police. Human Rights Watch has reported: ``The use of lethal force by the national police is a chronic problem.''. The United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights stated in 2019 that ``numerous evictions, seeking to allow business to operate, have been conducted with the excessive use of force by police and military . . . resulting in the loss of life and grave injury to people''.

(6) The Department of State's 2019 Human Rights Report for Honduras reported: ``Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces.''. It summarized: ``Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention.''. In 2020, Human Rights Watch reported that ``Security forces committed abuses while enforcing a nationwide COVID-19 lockdown that President Juan Orlando Hernandez imposed in March.''.

(7) Repeated efforts to clean up the Honduran police have largely failed. A recent commission charged with cleaning up the police reports that it has cleaned up over 5,000 members, but the great majority of those were separated for reasons of  restructuring, retirements, or disabilities. Only approximately 100 cases of alleged criminal activity have been forwarded to 

the Public Ministry for prosecution. Few of those are being prosecuted. The actions and results of the police cleanup commission have not been independently verified, moreover, and  its directors include Julian Pacheco Tinoco, the Minister of Security, named as a drug trafficker, and Vilma Morales, one of the top two negotiators for the leader of the 2009 coup. Long- lasting, fundamental reform of the police still needs to be enacted. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders determined that, ``progress (on police clean up) is diminished by the involvement of the armed forces in carrying out police functions and maintaining public order since 2011''. 

In its report for 2020, Human Rights Watch concludes: ``Efforts to reform public-security institutions have stalled. Marred by corruption and abuse, the judiciary and police remain largely ineffective. Impunity for human rights abuses, violent crime, and corruption remains the norm''.

 (8) Evidence indicates that topmost officials in charge of the police have been allegedly involved in drug trafficking.  The National Director of the Police and his top two lieutenants have been documented by the Associated Press to have previously participated in cocaine trafficking. Julian Pacheco Tinoco, the Minister of Security, reappointed in December 2018, has been twice named in United States Federal court as overseeing drug trafficking. United States Federal prosecutors have released documents implicating Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez in a drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy with his brother Juan Antonio Hernandez. In October 2019, Tony Hernandez was convicted of drug conspiracy in United States Federal Court.

 (9) Human rights organizations have documented that the Fifteenth Battalion of the Honduran Armed Forces allegedly participated with police and private security forces in some of 

the killings of over 100 small-farmer, agrarian reform activists in the Aguan Valley beginning in 2010. In 2015, Human Rights Watch confirmed that the killings of Aguan farmers were met with no consequences. To date there has been one confirmed conviction of a private security guard. Assassinations of key activists continue. In October 2016, Jose Angel Flores, the president of the Unified Campesino Movement of the Aguan (MUCA), and Silmer Dionisio George, another MUCA member, were assassinated, with impunity. Local human rights organizations report a chronic problem with witness intimidation coupled with reports that the identity of witnesses is leaked by police investigators. Violence, threats, and criminalization of  agrarian reform advocates in the region continues.

(10) Further examples abound of human rights abuses by the military: in July 2013 members of the Armed Forces shot and  killed Tomas Garcia, a Lenca Indigenous activist, and injured his son while they were peacefully protesting a dam project; in May 2014, nine members of the Ninth Infantry reportedly tortured and killed Amado Maradiaga Quiroz and tortured his son, Milton Noe Maradiaga Varela. The case remains in impunity. In an emblematic case, on December 27, 2015, the Honduran Navy reportedly killed Joel Palacios Lino and Elvis Armando Garcia, two Garifuna Afro-Indigenous men who were engaged in digging a car out of the sand on a beach. Ten members of the Honduran military were convicted of the killing of these 2 men, underscoring that egregious human rights are committed by state security forces. On June 20, 2019, Eblin Noe Corea, a 17-year-old student leader was killed by the military while participating in a protest with the Platform in Defense of Health and Education. On April 24, 2020, state security forces beat three brothers in Omoa, Cortes, shooting two of them and killing one after they were arbitrarily detained for selling bread. A member of the Army assigned to the Maya Chorti Task Force, is accused of the killing.

(11) The current Government of Honduras has expanded the  military's reach into domestic policing, including the creation of a 4,300-member Military Police in clear violation of the Honduran constitution and with disastrous results, including the killings of a 15-year-old boy, Ebed Yanes, in 2012 and a student, Erlin Misael Carias Moncada, in 2014, after they had passed unarmed through checkpoints, and the January 2, 2017, killing of 17-year-old Edgardo Moreno Rodriquez. While one member of the armed forces was convicted and sentenced in the  case of Yanes, the case of the United States-trained colonel  who allegedly subsequently ordered a cover-up remains in impunity. Since the creation of the Military Police,  ``allegations of human rights abuses by the military have  increased notably'', reports Human Rights Watch. The Military Police now count 9 battalions and plan 2 additional battalions.

(12) During the crisis that erupted following the highly  contested November 2017 Presidential election, massive protests against electoral fraud and the constitutionality of disputed  re-election campaign of President Juan Orlando Hernandez emerged throughout the country. The United Nations and the Committee of Families of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (COFADEH) have documented that in response, Honduran state security forces killed at least 23 people, many of them protesters and bystanders; one additional person remains forcibly disappeared by state security forces. The great majority of the victims, according to the UN and COFADEH reports, were killed by the Military Police. All these cases remain in impunity. In addition, 3 people accused of crimes while protesting were imprisoned for 2 years while awaiting trial under dire, life-threatening conditions; 3 years later they continue to be subjected to criminal proceedings characterized by procedural delays and obstruction of fundamental rights including the right to work. A fourth remains in exile.

(13) The Military Police continue to commit serious human rights abuses. On November 30, 2017, Daniel Isaac Varela, age 12, was wounded by members of the military police in Comayaguela during a post-election demonstration while he was purchasing candy with friends and the military opened fire. On December 3, 2017, Manuel de Jesus Bautista Salvador disappeared while held in detention by the Military Police in Cofradia, Cortes, and his whereabouts remain unknown. In response to the  COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Honduras declared a state of emergency in March 2020 authorizing a militarized lockdown and suspension of constitutional guarantees resulting in an  ``alarming increase'' in human rights violations by state security forces, including attacks on human rights defenders,  journalists, and citizens protesting for food. COFADEH reports  that with militarization of the country, there has been a reactivation of death squads resulting in 17 forced disappearances in 2020.

(14) The Honduran judicial system has been widely documented to be rife with corruption. Judges, prosecutors, and other officials are interconnected with organized crime and drug traffickers, contributing to near-complete impunity.

(15) The Department of State in its 2019 Human Rights Report for Honduras reports that ``there were several reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings''. It noted that ``Impunity remained a serious problem, with significant delays in some prosecutions and sources alleging corruption in judicial proceedings.''.

(16) Overall, the judicial system remains ineffective and corrupt. The IACHR report for 2019 states, ``The lack of access to justice has created a situation of structural impunity that has the effect of perpetuating and, in certain cases, favoring the repetition of serious human rights violations.''.

(17) Summarizing the situation, Human Rights Watch reported for 2019 that ``Judges face interference from the executive branch and others, including private actors with connections in government.''. It concludes: ``Efforts to reform public-security institutions have stalled. Marred by corruption and abuse, the judiciary and police remain largely ineffective. Impunity for crimes and human rights abuses is the norm.''.

(18) The March 2, 2016, assassination of prominent Lenca Indigenous and environmental activist Berta Caceres, world-renowned recipient of the 2015 Goldman Environmental Prize for her work defending Indigenous land rights against a hydroelectric dam project, illustrates the human rights crisis in Honduras, and the deep complicity of the Honduran government. Caceres, the leader of COPINH, the Council of  Indigenous and Popular Organizations of Honduras, had reported to authorities 33 threats previous to her killing, but none had been investigated, and the government had failed to provide  adequate protection measures as mandated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, with protection by Honduran security being withdrawn the day of her death.

(19) In December 2019, seven men were convicted in the killing of Caceres. One of them was an active duty officer in the military at the time of his arrest and two others are former military. Prosecution of the intellectual authors is still pending. Evidence made public in the trial indicates the  participation of several executives and directors of DESA Corporation, the dam construction company, in the murder scheme. However, only the president of DESA, a former military officer has been charged. Though charged in March 2018, his  trial has yet to begin due to unreasonable delays initiated by defense lawyers and permitted by the judiciary. The convictions raise serious questions about the role of the Honduran military in her assassination, including higher ranks in the chain of command within the military as well as the identity of the intellectual authors of the assassination. Evidence in the documents in the case file indicate that members of the Honduran elite were responsible for ordering Caceres's assassination, and remain in impunity. Evidence also indicates possible involvement of individuals of higher rank in the military, but there is no indication that prosecutors are  investigating these individuals.

 (20) The Government of Honduras continues to unduly limit legally mandated access by Ms. Caceres's family to participation in the prosecution as permitted under Honduran  law.

(21) In this context of corruption and human rights abuses, trade unionists, journalists, lawyers, Afro-Indigenous activists, Indigenous activists, small-farmer activists, LGBTI activists, human rights defenders, environmental defenders, and critics of the government remain at severe risk; and previous human rights abuses against them remain largely unpunished.

 (22) Journalists continue to be attacked with impunity. On May 2, 2016, prominent opposition journalist Felix Molina was shot multiple times in the legs hours after he had posted  information potentially linking Caceres's killing to a top government official, members of an elite family, and one of the prosecutors in the case. Those who report on protests against  the government are threatened and attacked by state security forces. On November 26, 2018, journalist Geovanny Sierra from  the UNETV opposition television station was in the process of  reporting on the repression by security forces of a protest marking the one-year anniversary of the disputed 2017 elections when he was fired upon by members of the police assigned to the National Penitentiary. He survived the attack but suffered extensive injuries to his right arm. Both cases remain in impunity. Four journalists were killed in 2020.

(23) United States agencies allocated approximately $39 million that Congress appropriated through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, to the Honduran police and military for fiscal year 2017.

(24) The Inter-American Development Bank lent $60,000,000 to the Honduran police between 2012 and 2018, with United States approval.

SEC. 3. SUSPENSION AND RESTRICTIONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE EXTENDED TO 

              REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS UNLESS CERTAIN CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN 

              MET.

 (a) Suspension of Security Assistance.--No funds may be made available to provide assistance for the police or military of the  Republic of Honduras, including assistance for equipment and training.

(b) Loans From Multilateral Development Banks.--The Secretary of  the Treasury shall instruct United States representatives at  multilateral development banks to vote no on any loans for the police or military of the Republic of Honduras.

SEC. 4. CONDITIONS FOR LIFTING SUSPENSIONS AND RESTRICTIONS.
The provisions of this Act shall terminate on the date on which the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign  Relations of the Senate that the Government of Honduras has–

(1) pursued all legal avenues to bring to trial and obtain a verdict of all those who ordered and carried out--     

(A) the March 2, 2016, murder of Berta Caceres;

(B) the killings of over 100 small-farmer activists in the Aguan Valley;

(C) the killings of 22 people and forced disappearance of 1 person by state security forces in the context of the 2017 postelectoral crisis;

(D) the May 3, 2016, armed attack on journalist Felix Molina, and the November 26, 2018, shooting of journalist Geovanny Sierra;

(E) the July 18, 2020, forced disappearances of 4 Garifuna community leaders from Triunfo de la Cruz who were taken from their homes by heavily armed men wearing bulletproof vests and police uniforms; and

(F) the December 26, 2020, killing of indigenous Lenca leader Felix Vasques in La Paz, and the December 28, 2020, killing of indigenous Tolupan leader Adan Mejia in Yoro.

(2) investigated and successfully prosecuted members of military and police forces who are credibly found to have violated human rights, and ensured that the military and police  cooperated in such cases, and that such violations have ceased;

(3) withdrawn the military from domestic policing, in  accordance with the Honduran Constitution, and ensured that all domestic police functions are separated from the command and  control of the Armed Forces of Honduras and are instead directly responsible to civilian authority;

(4) established that it protects effectively the rights of trade unionists, journalists, human rights defenders, the Indigenous, the Afro-Indigenous, small-farmers, LGBTI 

activists, critics of the government, and other civil society activists to operate without interference; and

(5) taken effective steps to fully establish the rule of  law and to guarantee a judicial system that is capable of investigating, prosecuting, and bringing to justice members of the police and military who have committed human rights abuses.

                                 

OFRANEH and Garífuna Resolution

 A Resolution Affirming the Rights of the Garífuna People Reps. Bush, Omar, García, Schakowsky & Bowman 

Endorsing Organizations: Black Fraternal Organization of Honduras (OFRANEH), Witness for Peace Solidarity Collective (WfP-SC), Institute for Policy Studies - Global Economy Program, School of the Americas Watch (SOAW), Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA), Honduras Solidarity Network (HSN) 

The Afro-Indigenous Garífuna people are one of nine Indigenous peoples of Honduras. The territory that stretches along the Caribbean coast of Honduras is the ancestral home of the majority of the world’s Garífuna. The presence of vibrant Garífuna immigrant communities in the United States has been recorded by oral history and scholarly research since the early 20th century. In 2001, UNESCO issued a proclamation declaring the Garífuna language and culture a “Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity.” 

Unfortunately, in recent years the Garífuna community has experienced significant violence, appropriation, and other human rights abuses. To name just a few examples: 

  • In 1997, the Honduran government arrested Garífuna leader Alfredo López Álvarez on drug possession and trafficking charges; he was wrongly detained for six years and acquitted of the charges in 2003. 

  • The International Finance Corporation has provided financing to the Dinant Corporation, which is implicated in violent land disputes and illegal appropriation of Garífuna land. 

  • The Honduran government has attempted to characterize certain Garífuna territory as unpopulated and cede its governance to foreign governments or private corporations. 

  • Garífuna leaders have been threatened, arrested, abducted and murdered, often by Honduran security forces. At least 16 Garífuna land defenders were murdered in 2019. In July 2020, four Garífuna men were abducted at gunpoint by men wearing uniforms bearing the logo of a Honduran security forces unit; instead of investigating and prosecuting those responsible, the Honduran Attorney General called for criminal proceedings against OFRANEH leaders. And in November 2022, Honduran security forces carried out a violent eviction of the Garífuna community of Punta Gorda on Roatán Island. 

The plight of the Garífuna people has not gone unnoticed. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have repeatedly determined that the Honduran government has violated their rights. Yet little has changed regarding the treatment of the Garífuna people. Following a March 2021 Congressional Delegation trip to Honduras, Representatives Bush, Omar, García, Schakowsky, and Bowman worked closely with partner organizations and the Garífuna community to author a resolution that affirms the rights of the Garífuna people. This resolution: 

  • Condemns violence against Garífuna people and the illegal separation from their legitimate land rights, and calls for the implementation of a 2015 Inter-American Court ruling restoring those land rights; 

  • Calls for the full participation of an independent commission created by Garífuna communities in the investigation of the four Garífuna men abducted in July 2020; 

  • Calls for a Special Prosecutor for Enforced Disappearances in Honduras; 

  • Calls on the World Bank Group and Inter-American Development Bank to review past projects that may have contributed to violating the human rights of the Garífuna people, and ensure compliance with the provisions of ILO Convention 169 regarding prior consultation before the approval of projects that affect Garífuna communities; and 

  • Calls on the U.S. government to engage with the Honduran government and international allies and organizations to promote compliance with the 2015 Court judgment, and use its influence within multilateral development banks to oppose projects that may threaten the rights of Garífuna communities and advocate for reparations for affected communities. 

Chixoy International Financial Institution Reparations Act of 2022

117th Congress

2nd session (December 20, 2022)

To support reparations for victims of human rights violations associated with projects financed by international financial institutions.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

December 20, 2022

Mr. García of Illinois (for himself, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Omar, Mr. Pocan, and Mr. Grijalva) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

A BILL

To support reparations for victims of human rights violations associated with projects financed by international financial institutions.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Chixoy International Financial Institution Reparations Act of 2022”.

SEC. 2. Findings.

The Congress finds the following:

(1) Beginning in 1976, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank financed the construction of the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala while the country was in the midst of a civil war. The Armed Forces of the military Government of Guatemala were broadly and credibly accused of having committed gross violations of internationally recognized human rights during the civil war, which led the United States Government to suspend security assistance to the Government of Guatemala.

(2) The construction of the Chixoy Dam forcibly displaced more than 3,500 members of the Maya Achi indigenous community and disrupted the livelihoods of thousands more. When residents of the Rio Negro community objected to leaving their homes, which were to be flooded by the construction of the dam, they were massacred, raped, and kidnapped by paramilitary and military forces. In its analysis of the Rio Negro massacres, the United Nations-sponsored Historical Clarification Commission concluded that peaceful resistance to administrative decisions related to the construction of the hydroelectric dam were conceived a priori as instigated by the guerrillas and were resolved through violent repression. Therefore, the army’s command responsibility and intent to destroy Rio Negro constituted an act of genocide against the civilian population. Between 1980 and 1982, an estimated 5,000 Maya Achi lost their lives through extrajudicial killings.

(3) Effective resettlement measures were never provided for communities displaced by the Chixoy Dam project. After enduring decades of extreme poverty stemming from their displacement, in 2010, the communities and the Government of Guatemala agreed to the Reparations Plan for Damages Suffered by the Communities Affected by the Construction of the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam in Guatemala. In 2014, the President of Guatemala asked forgiveness from the communities for the Government’s role in the harm caused by the project and signed the reparations agreement into law. The Government has not allocated the funds necessary to implement reparations.

(4) Senior management at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank knew of the atrocities that occurred during the construction of the Chixoy Dam and of the lack of resettlement. These institutions have assumed no direct responsibility for atrocities resulting from the construction of the dam.

(5) International financial institutions have repeatedly financed projects that have contributed to human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, forced labor, forced displacement of indigenous peoples, forced labor, arbitrary detention, loss of livelihood, and reduced access to food and water. For example, from 2007 to 2013, the World Bank funded a conservation program implemented by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS), which regularly engaged in forced evictions of forest communities. With financing from the World Bank, KFS burned the homes of Sengwer indigenous peoples and violently displaced them. Many Sengwer remain landless and impoverished, struggling to have their rights to ancestral lands respected. In 2013, the Accelerating Infrastructure Investment Facility in India financed by the Asian Development Bank resulted in gross labor violations of at least 116 workers in the construction of the subproject of Kiratpur-Nerchowk Highway. The Asian Development Bank’s subcontractor, Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, still owes the workers back wages and unpaid benefits.

(6) International financial institutions, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have an obligation to comply with international law, including international human rights law, in all of their activities.

(7) The United States Government has long used its voting power to advocate for strengthened accountability in international financial institutions.

(8) The International Financial Institutions Act requires that the United States Government use its voice and role at the international financial institutions in which it is a shareholder to advance the cause of human rights and promote mechanisms to strengthen the environmental performance of those institutions, including strengthening organizational, administrative, and procedural arrangements within the institutions so as to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources and protect indigenous peoples.

(9) The International Development and Finance Act requires the United States Government not to vote in favor of any international financial institution-financed project that would result or be likely to result in a significant effect on the human environment, unless the assessment or a comprehensive summary of the assessment has been made available to affected groups and local nongovernmental organizations. This has led directly to stronger environmental assessment policies at the international financial institutions.

(10) The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (Public Law 113–76), requires the United States Government to use its voice and vote at international financial institutions to ensure that each such institution responds to the recommendations of its accountability mechanisms, and provides redress to individuals and communities that have suffered human rights violations. That Act also instructs the United States Executive Directors at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to report to the Committees on Appropriations on steps being taken to support the implementation of the 2010 Reparations Plan for Damages Suffered by the Communities Affected by the Construction of the Chixoy Dam Hydroelectric Dam in Guatemala.

(11) In Jam v. International Finance Corporation, the Supreme Court ruled that international organizations are not absolutely immune from lawsuits in United States courts and can be sued in connection to their commercial activity.

SEC. 3. Promotion of measures to provide reparations for communities damaged by projects financed by international financial institutions of which the United States is a shareholder.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to vigorously promote—

(1) the adoption and implementation of policies that ensure that the institution does not support activities that are likely to cause or contribute to human rights violations or abuses, including by undertaking adequate, publicly available human rights assessments to become aware of and prevent potential adverse effects on human rights from any proposed projects;

(2) the adoption and implementation of procedures under which individuals or communities that suffer violations of human rights resulting from any loan, grant, strategy, or policy of the institution may initiate a reparations process, outlined in a negotiated, mutually acceptable, and publicly available reparations plan; and

(3) the creation of a reparations fund at the institution—

(A) to which international financial institutions shall contribute a fixed percentage of the revenue earned on all lending and other investments by the institution;

(B) which shall be managed by a board of directors and operated transparently and independently from the institution; and

(C) which shall be dedicated to providing financial resources—

(i) to support the full and effective participation of the individuals and communities in negotiations for the reparations plan referred to in paragraph (2), including technical and legal support;

(ii) for the full implementation of any reparations plan negotiated by the parties; and

(iii) for establishing and operating monitoring panels to review and issue independent periodic reports detailing progress and challenges encountered in implementing the reparations plan referred to in paragraph (2) and clause (ii) of this subparagraph.

SEC. 4. Prohibition on favorable vote for proposal until receipt of report on its effect on human rights and corruption.

(a) The United States Executive Director at each international financial institution should request a report from the institution that contains—

(1) an assessment, in line with international best practices, of human rights and corruption risks associated with the project, including relevant legacy issues that existed before the involvement of the institution;

(2) details describing how the implementers of the project will avoid, directly or indirectly, contributing to adverse effects on local communities; and

(3) plans detailing how the institution will avoid participating in corrupt practices throughout the life cycle of the project.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to not vote in favor of a proposal to provide financial support for a project to be implemented in a country or sector if—

(1) the United States Executive Director has not received the report described in subsection (a);

(2) the government of the country has refused to accept or renew the mandate of a group or person acting under the authority of the United Nations or a regional intergovernmental human rights treaty body to which the country is party; or

(3) the government of the country is obstructing the implementation of a reparations plan.

SEC. 5. Opposition to international financial institution financing for corporation involved in a project that violates human rights.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose the provision of financing, indefinitely or for a limited period of time, for a project of a corporation that has been involved in another project that violates internationally recognized human rights, until an independent investigation finds that the involvement of the corporation in the other project did not violate such rights or that the corporation has made full reparations or remedy.

SEC. 6. Definition of international financial institution.

In this Act, the term “international financial institution” has the meaning given the term in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act.

Honduras Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2021

117th Congress (2021-2022)

S. 388

To suspend certain United States assistance for the Government of Honduras until corruption, impunity, and human rights violations are no longer systemic, and the perpetrators of these crimes are being brought to justice.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 23, 2021

Mr. Merkley (for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Markey, Mr. Sanders, Ms. Warren, Mr. Whitehouse, and Mr. Van Hollen) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To suspend certain United States assistance for the Government of Honduras until corruption, impunity, and human rights violations are no longer systemic, and the perpetrators of these crimes are being brought to justice.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Honduras Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Act of 2021”.

SEC. 2. Police or military of the Republic of Honduras defined.

In this Act, the term “police or military of the Republic of Honduras” means—

(1) the Honduran National Police;

(2) the Honduran Armed Forces;

(3) the Military Police of Public Order of the Republic of Honduras; or

(4) para-police or paramilitary elements, acting under color of law or having received financing, training, orders, intelligence, weapons, or other forms of material assistance from the forces identified in paragraphs (1) through (3).

SEC. 3. Findings.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the 2009 military coup, the Republic of Honduras remains plagued by systemic corruption and human rights violations, exemplified by—

(A) widespread collusion among government officials, state and private security forces, organized crime, and members of the private sector, including in the knowledge and perpetration of physical and legal threats, assassinations, forced disappearances, and other abuses against human rights and environmental defenders, members of the political opposition, journalists, and others;

(B) the excessive use of force by members of the police or military of the Republic of Honduras, particularly in the context of civil society protests;

(C) the failure of the Government of Honduras to protect the rights, interests, and physical security of indigenous peoples in land and natural resources disputes, in contravention of its obligations under the Honduran constitution and under international treaties to which it is a state party; and

(D) the failure of the Government of Honduras to enforce the Honduran Labor Code in violation of its obligations under International Labor Organization Conventions, which the Government of Honduras has ratified, guaranteeing freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and other fundamental labor protections.

(2) There is substantial evidence that President of Honduras Juan Orlando Hernández has engaged in a pattern of criminal activity and use of the state apparatus to protect and facilitate drug trafficking, as exemplified by three high-profile corruption and drug trafficking cases that were tried or are being prosecuted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in which the President of Honduras was named as a co-conspirator, including the following:

(A) The October 2019 conviction of the President of Honduras’s brother Juan Antonio Hernández, in which Federal prosecutors and multiple witnesses testified that the President of Honduras received $1,500,000 in drug proceeds that were funneled toward his successful 2013 presidential campaign, and that organized crime had infiltrated the Honduran National Police and National Party.

(B) The March 2020 indictment of Geovanny Daniel Fuentes, a drug trafficker, in which Federal prosecutors alleged that the President of Honduras accepted $25,000 in bribes in exchange for protecting the defendant from law enforcement intervention against his cocaine trafficking activities and facilitated the use of Honduran military personnel as security for the defendant’s drug trafficking operations. On February 5, 2021, Federal prosecutors filed a court document stating that the President of Honduras was under investigation in connection with the case.

(C) The April 2020 indictment of former National Director of Police Juan Carlos “El Tigre” Bonilla, in which Federal prosecutors alleged that the President of Honduras accepted bribes from drug traffickers, facilitated multi-ton shipments of cocaine bound for the United States, and entrusted the defendant with special assignments, including murder.

(3) The President of Honduras has also demonstrated a track record of contempt for the rule of law, exhibited by—

(A) his support for the 2009 military coup, repudiated as unlawful by the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and numerous foreign governments, while a member of Congress;

(B) his support for a 2012 congressional measure, widely viewed as illegal, to replace four Supreme Court justices while the leader of Congress; and

(C) his 2017 candidacy for a second presidential term, in violation of the Honduran constitution’s longstanding prohibition on presidential reelection, which in 2015 was nullified in a ruling by the justices referred to in subparagraph (B).

(4) In recent months, the executive and legislative branches of the Government of Honduras have taken significant steps to entrench corruption, block oversight by national prosecutors and international investigators, and shield senior officials and parliamentarians from criminal liability, including the following actions:

(A) On January 19, 2020, the Government of Honduras announced the closing of the Mission of Support against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), the anti-corruption mechanism established in 2015 by the Organization of American States and the Government of Honduras. MACCIH brought 14 corruption-related cases against dozens of high-profile criminal defendants and oversaw the creation of an anti-corruption judicial circuit and special prosecutor’s unit that was disbanded following the mission’s closure.

(B) On June 25, 2020, the Government of Honduras enacted a new penal code that reduced prison terms for corruption-related crimes, including embezzlement, illicit enrichment, obstruction of justice, and fraud. The measure is retroactive, benefitting Honduran officials already convicted or facing prosecution.

(C) On October 16, 2019, the National Congress of Honduras passed a law that restored immunity to all parliamentarians for crimes related to legislative activities and a law that blocked the Attorney General’s office from investigating cases involving the improper use of state funds for up to 7 years.

(5) These recent measures follow a longer pattern of congressional decrees of amnesty or immunity for crimes perpetrated by authorities in Honduras, including for those committed during the 2009 coup and its aftermath, those perpetrated by state security forces, and those involving the misuse of public funds by former and current legislators, contributing to a climate of impunity.

(6) Space for civil society to operate in the Republic of Honduras remains severely constrained, with rights activists and journalists subject to acute levels of violence, surveillance, harassment, and intimidation. The Republic of Honduras ranks as the deadliest country in the world for human rights and environmental defenders on a per capita basis and third in the number of assassinations, with 31 defenders killed in 2019 and 204 defenders killed since 2009.

(7) The 2019 United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, international human rights bodies, and numerous monitoring groups have reported that the Honduran police and military commit human rights violations with impunity, including unlawful killings, torture, and the use of unnecessary force and lethal weapons against protestors and civilian bystanders. Individuals with documented records of human rights violations and links to drug trafficking continue to serve in high-ranking positions within the Honduran police and military, and few of the alleged cases of human rights abuses perpetrated by police and military personnel are prosecuted or tried in court.

(8) The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have documented the use of arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and specious judicial proceedings to criminalize indigenous and human rights activists, environmental defenders, journalists, opposition politicians, and others, including—

(A) members of the Tocoa Municipal Committee for the Defense of Common and Public Assets, who since September 2019 have been detained pending trial following their protest of an illegal mining concession affecting the Guapinol and San Pedro rivers;

(B) four Afro-indigenous Garífuna land defenders, who on July 18, 2020, were abducted from their homes and reportedly forced into unmarked vehicles at gunpoint by armed men in police uniforms without a warrant and remain forcibly disappeared; and

(C) opposition lawmaker María Luisa Borjas, who on July 21, 2020, was convicted of defamation and sentenced to nearly three years in prison for naming Ficohsa bank president Camilo Atala as an intellectual author of the 2016 assassination of environmental and indigenous rights activist Berta Cáceres.

(9) The vilification and criminalization of civil society actors and human rights defenders by Honduran authorities has continued unabated under the cover of COVID–19 pandemic response. On March 16, 2020, the Government of Honduras first notified the Organization of American States of its derogation from treaty obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and has since suspended nine constitutional guarantees, including the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, the latter of which was restored after international outcry. At least 34,000 citizens have been detained for violating curfew and lockdown restrictions, and journalists and human rights defenders have been impeded in their efforts to report on and expose human rights abuses during the pandemic.

SEC. 4. Sense of Congress.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) systemic corruption, impunity, and human rights violations by national government officials, private citizens, and members of the police and military of the Republic of Honduras deplete public resources and fuel widespread impoverishment, citizen insecurity, and forced displacement;

(2) the President should impose sanctions on President of Honduras Juan Orlando Hernández for acts of significant corruption and human rights violations and determine under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations under part 598 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, whether the President of Honduras is a specially designated narcotics trafficker;

(3) the President and Secretary of State should seek to ensure that security assistance from the United States and exports of munitions by United States entities are not complicit in human rights abuses perpetrated by the police and military of the Government of Honduras, or misused to impede peaceful protestors, human rights and environmental defenders, and others from exercising the right to freedom of expression, association, or assembly;

(4) the Government of Honduras should immediately initiate discussions with the United Nations to negotiate the mandate for a new, independent mechanism to combat corruption and impunity with a mission comparable to that of MACCIH, equipped with—

(A) the authority to initiate cases, in coordination with the Specialized Prosecutor’s Unit against Networks of Corruption (UFERCO), against any citizen of the Republic of Honduras, irrespective of their office, rank, position, or title;

(B) the unimpeded authority to investigate, including the authority to subpoena documents, interview witnesses and suspects, and conduct surveillance;

(C) the ability to propose laws, constitutional amendments, and regulatory changes to the Attorney General’s office and other institutions within the justice sector that are assured expeditious consideration and debate by the National Congress; and

(D) the requirement to conduct regular and transparent consultations with a broad range of civil society members with the goal of promoting the mandate’s successful implementation;

(5) the Government of Honduras should continue to pursue MACCIH’s ongoing anti-corruption cases and adopt legal and institutional reforms to strengthen judicial independence and protect human rights recommended by MACCIH, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UFERCO;

(6) the United States should support credible national and international efforts to combat corruption and human rights violations in the Republic of Honduras, including UFERCO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and organizations working to defend human rights and expose and prevent corruption, with the necessary resources for holding private and government actors accountable under the law and supporting independent monitoring by a free press and civil society, provided that they demonstrate sufficient political autonomy and willingness to prosecute high-level cases, including against senior officials and legislators of the Republic of Honduras; and

(7) the Secretary of State should develop, in consultation with a broad range of representatives of civil society and human rights organizations in Honduras, as appropriate, comprehensive and specific guidelines to use United States diplomacy and assistance to protect human rights and environmental defenders in the Republic of Honduras from physical, legal, or financial reprisals and threats, including by government, police, and military officials or their associates.

SEC. 5. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

In addition to amounts otherwise appropriated for such purposes, there is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 in voluntary contributions to support the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras to monitor and document human rights violations, issue public reports and recommendations, and promote international human rights standards.

SEC. 6. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the President of Honduras.

(a) Imposition of sanctions.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to the President of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández.

(b) Sanctions described.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of Juan Orlando Hernández if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—Juan Orlando Hernández is—

(i) inadmissible to the United States;

(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and

(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Juan Orlando Hernández is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in Juan Orlando Hernández’s possession.

(c) Implementation; penalties.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this section.

(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1), or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection, shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.

(d) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is important to the national interest of the United States.

(e) Exceptions.—

(1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply if admitting or paroling Juan Orlando Hernández into the United States is necessary—

(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or

(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.

(2) EXCEPTION RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.

(f) Termination of sanctions.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before the termination takes effect that—

(1) credible information exists that Juan Orlando Hernández did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;

(2) Juan Orlando Hernández has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed; or

(3) Juan Orlando Hernández has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an activity for which the sanctions were imposed in the future.

(g) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED.—The terms “admission” and “admitted” have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—

(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or

(C) any person in the United States.


SEC. 7. Prohibition on commercial export of covered defense articles and services and covered munitions items to the Honduran police or military.

(a) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall prohibit the issuance of licenses to export covered defense articles and services and covered munitions items to the police or military of the Republic of Honduras.

(b) Termination.—The prohibition under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date on which the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the police or military of the Republic of Honduras have not engaged in gross violations during the one-year period ending on the date of such determination.

(c) Waiver.—The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply to the issuance of a license with respect to which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a written certification that the exports to be covered by such license are important to the national interests and foreign policy goals of the United States, including a description of the manner in which such exports will promote such interests and goals.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) COVERED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.—The term “covered defense articles and services” means defense articles and defense services designated by the President under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(3) COVERED MUNITIONS ITEMS.—The term “covered munitions items” means tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, foam rounds, bean bag rounds, pepper balls, water cannons, handcuffs, shackles, stun guns, tasers, semi-automatic firearms, and their associated munitions not included in the definition under paragraph (2).

SEC. 8. Suspension and restrictions of security assistance extended to the Republic of Honduras unless certain conditions are met.

(a) Suspension of security assistance.—No assistance may be made available for the police or military of the Republic of Honduras, including assistance for equipment and training.

(b) Loans from multilateral development banks and the United States International Development Finance Corporation.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall—

(1) instruct United States representatives at multilateral development banks to use their voice and vote to oppose any loans for the police or military of the Republic of Honduras; and

(2) instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation to promote human rights due diligence and risk management in connection with any loan, grant, policy, or strategy related to the Republic of Honduras, in accordance with the criteria specified in subsection 7029(d) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94; 133 Stat. 2863) and accompanying report.

(c) Conditions for lifting suspensions and restrictions.—The provisions of this section shall terminate on the date on which the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Appropriations of the House of Representatives that the Government of Honduras has—

(1) pursued all legal avenues to bring to trial and obtain a verdict of all those who ordered, carried out, and covered up—

(A) the March 2, 2016, murder of Berta Cáceres;

(B) the killings of over 100 small-farmer activists in the Aguán Valley;

(C) the killings of 22 people and forced disappearance of 1 person by state security forces in the context of the 2017 post-electoral crisis;

(D) the killings of at least 6 people by state security forces in the context of anti-government demonstrations between March and July of 2019;

(E) the killings of at least 21 journalists and media workers between October 2016 and July 2020;

(F) the July 18, 2020, forced disappearances of 4 Garífuna community leaders from Triunfo de la Cruz; and

(G) the December 26, 2020, killing of indigenous Lenca leader and environmental activist Félix Vásquez at his home in La Paz, and the December 29, 2020, killing of indigenous Tolupan leader and environmental activist Adan Mejía in Yoro;

(2) investigated and successfully prosecuted members of military and police forces who are credibly found to have violated human rights and ensured that the military and police cooperated in such cases, and that such violations have ceased;

(3) withdrawn the military from domestic policing and ensured that all domestic police functions are separated from the command and control of the Armed Forces of Honduras and are instead directly responsible to civilian authority;

(4) established that it protects effectively the rights of trade unionists, journalists, small farmers, human rights and environmental defenders, indigenous and Afro-indigenous community members and rights activists, women’s and LGBTQI rights activists, critics of the government, and other members of civil society to operate without interference or repression; and

(5) taken effective steps to establish the rule of law and to guarantee a judicial system that is capable of investigating, prosecuting, and bringing to justice members of the police and military who have committed human rights abuses.

SEC. 9. Sunset.

This Act shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

ISDS and Trade

May 03, 2023

Senator Warren, Representative Doggett Call for Elimination of Investor-State Dispute Settlement System, Action on Behalf of Honduran Government

“We urge you to uphold your commitment and refrain from negotiating new trade agreements with ISDS, and also to address the existing ISDS mechanisms that corporations continue to exploit.”

Response from State Department
Response from U.S. Trade Representative

Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Representative Lloyd Doggett (D-Texas) led more than 30 of their colleagues in sending a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and Secretary of State Tony Blinken, urging them to intervene on behalf of the government and people of Honduras in a case brought against it by U.S. company Honduras Próspera under the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system.

“We request that you intervene—through a statement of support, amicus brief, and any other means at your disposal—in support of Honduras’ defense in the Próspera ISDS case and to ensure that such egregious cases can no longer disrupt democratic policymaking by working to eliminate ISDS liability in preexisting agreements in our hemisphere,” wrote the lawmakers.

ISDS was incorporated into trade agreements as a dispute settlement system that allows a corporation to directly sue the government of a foreign trading partner if it feels that that government’s domestic legislative or executive action violates the corporation’s rights under the trade agreement. Instead of going through domestic courts, these complaints, handled by private arbitration tribunals made up of corporate lawyers, give corporations a disproportionate advantage. Arbitrators can require governments to shell out millions or billions of dollars in damages, diverting critical funds needed for domestic programs, with no option to appeal the ruling. Workers and consumers have no such special avenue to pursue complaints and enforce labor and environmental trade commitments.

“These provisions tilt the playing field even further in favor of large corporations, incentivizing offshoring and undermining the sovereignty of the United States and other governments,” wrote the lawmakers. “Furthermore, ISDS is not needed to promote positive investment and in fact continues to harm human rights and hinder efforts to address climate change.”

Próspera was established under Honduras’ Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico law (ZEDE, or “Economic Development and Employment Zones”) by the U.S. company Honduras Próspera. ZEDEs are quasi-sovereign private governance zones where companies can operate almost independently from the Honduran government, establishing their own tax codes, court systems, and labor laws. Last year, following the Honduran government’s repeal of the ZEDE law, Honduras Próspera launched an ISDS claim under the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) seeking almost $11 billion, which amounts to nearly two-thirds of the country’s entire 2022 budget.

“This case is just the most recent example of the worrying trend of increased ISDS use in the Americas, both in the number of cases and the sky-high value of the claims,” wrote the lawmakers. “Governments throughout Latin America have paid billions of dollars in compensation to foreign companies at their taxpayers’ expense, simply for putting in place sound public policy to protect the environment and the health and economic well-being of their communities.” 

In the letter, the lawmakers urge Ambassador Tai and Secretary Blinken to investigate and pursue an effective path to removing consent to ISDS arbitration by the U.S. and our treaty partners in existing bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements.

The letter is also signed by Senators Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) and Representatives Susan Wild (D-Pa.), Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.), Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), Raúl Grijalva (D-Ariz.), Greg Casar (D-Texas), Jesús “Chuy” Garcia (D-Ill.), Jamaal Bowman (D-N.Y.), Paul Tonko (D-N.Y.), Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Mark Pocan (D-Wis.), Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), Veronica Escobar (D-Texas), Nydia Velazquez (D-N.Y.), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.), James McGovern (D-Mass.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), Cori Bush (D-Mo.), Jared Huffman (D-Calif.), Summer Lee (D-Pa.), Donald Norcross (D-N.J.), Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), Barbara Lee (D-Calif.), Jill Tokuda (D-Hawaii), Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), Hank Johnson (D-Ga.), and Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio).

Senator Warren has been a leading opponent of ISDS and remains committed to removing it from international trade agreements.

  • In September 2017, Senator Warren sent a letter to then-U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, urging him to push for the removal of  ISDS provisions as he renegotiates the terms for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

  • In February 2015, Senator Warren published an Op-Ed in the Washington Post expressing opposition to ISDS as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Garífuna Resolution

118th, 2nd Session

June 5, 2024

H.R. Res. 1278. 

Affirming the importance of the survival of Garífuna culture and identity, condemning the violent and illegal appropriation of Garífuna territory, urging the Department of State and multilateral development banks to respect the rights of the Garífuna people, and calling on the Government of Honduras to fully comply with the resolutions of multilateral human rights bodies which mandate the return of Garífuna land and territory, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 5, 2024

Ms. Bush (for herself, Mr. Bowman, Mr. García of Illinois, Ms. Omar, and Ms. Schakowsky) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

RESOLUTION

Affirming the importance of the survival of Garífuna culture and identity, condemning the violent and illegal appropriation of Garífuna territory, urging the Department of State and multilateral development banks to respect the rights of the Garífuna people, and calling on the Government of Honduras to fully comply with the resolutions of multilateral human rights bodies which mandate the return of Garífuna land and territory, and for other purposes.

Whereas the United States and the Republic of Honduras share an important relationship, which includes deep and long standing economic, social, and cultural ties;

Whereas the Afro-Indigenous Garífuna people, descendants of the Arawak Indigenous people of St. Vincent Island and of African castaways destined to be sold into slavery in the Americas, are 1 of 9 Indigenous peoples of Honduras;

Whereas the Afro-Indigenous Garífuna territory that has stretched along the Caribbean coast of Honduras since before the nation was declared independent from Spain on September 15, 1821, is the ancestral home of the majority of the world’s Garífuna, and as such is essential to the cultural survival and well-being of the Garífuna people;

Whereas the Government of Honduras ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights on September 5, 1977, and the Constitution of Honduras establishes that the human rights treaties to which Honduras is a party are considered to hold the same legal effect as the Constitution, and therefore the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are binding on the Government of Honduras;

Whereas the presence of diverse Garífuna immigrant communities in the United States has been recorded by oral history and scholarly research since the early 20th century and has long contributed to the cultural diversity that we, as a Nation, so deeply cherish;

Whereas, on September 4, 2020, the coordinator of the Black Fraternal Organization of Honduras (OFRANEH) publicly denounced a third wave of violent dispossession against the Garífuna people and signaled that special development zones, the massive production of African palm cultivation, and tourism enclaves are drivers of the destruction of Garífuna life in Honduras;

Whereas Garífuna communities have been heavily impacted by the effects of climate change, manifesting in droughts, coastal erosion, and floods during hurricane season that have caused irreversible damage to communities, disruption of food availability, and forced migration;

Whereas, since 2018, there have been more than 150 Garífuna people killed, 37 criminalized, and 5 forcibly disappeared for defending their ancestral lands and territories from corrupt economic and political interests, which form a part of institutional and systemic racism that manifests in police brutality, illegal detentions, harassment by local authorities, and forced displacement;

Whereas the experience of forced and systematic displacement has emptied communities and put Garífuna identity and survival as a differentiated ethnic unit in Honduras at risk;

Whereas the Garífuna communities along the northern coast of Honduras are located in territories disputed by organized crime that, driven by consumer demand in the United States, has converted much of these territories into drug laboratories and cocaine plantations, and is responsible for multiple threats, disappearances, and murders of Garífuna defenders;

Whereas the Government of Honduras and its judiciary have engaged in a pattern of falsely accusing the Indigenous people of the north coast of engaging in drug trans-shipment as justification for violating their fundamental rights, including the right to life and liberty, and the Honduran military forces have engaged in a pattern of deadly use of force against Garífuna and other Indigenous peoples of the Caribbean coast with similar justifications;

Whereas the former President of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernandez, was extradited to the United States on April 21, 2022, and convicted on March 8, 2024, of Federal charges relating to his use of public office, law enforcement, and the military to facilitate major drug-trafficking operations along the north coast from 2004 to 2022;

Whereas testimony given in 2019 during the trial of the former Honduran President’s brother, Tony Hernandez, also directly implicated then-Security Minister Julian Pacheco in drug trafficking carried out along the north coast;

Whereas the United States provided Honduras with millions of dollars in security aid throughout the Hernandez Presidency and continues to train Honduran military units on the northern coast of Honduras, including at bases such as the 15th Battalion and 4th Naval Base that have been implicated in serious human rights abuses and corruption associated with organized criminal activity;

Whereas, on June 21, 2012, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) signed a $60,000,000 loan agreement with Hernandez’s Security Minister Julian Pacheco that was used to finance the creation of the new Dirección Policial de Investigaciones (DPI) of the Honduran National Police, among other Honduran security forces activities;

Whereas, in September 2013, the Hernandez-aligned legislature passed the Organic Law of the Employment and Economic Development Zones (ZEDE), which authorized foreign companies to create quasi-sovereign private governance zones within Honduras and establish their own laws, courts, and police force, among other powers;

Whereas this law declared coastal departments consisting of large swaths of Garífuna and other Indigenous territory as “low-population zones” subject to the imposition of a ZEDE without community consultation and consent;

Whereas, since 2012, Garífuna communities have actively resisted the development of the ZEDE “Prospera” and the associated areas of “Port Royal” and “St. John’s Bay” on the Honduran island of Roatan, which were established without community consent and which threaten the local population with the disbanding of ancestral, collective land titles and the displacement of the Garífuna people;

Whereas, on March 18, 2021, the Port of Satuyé, located in the Garífuna communities of Sambo Creek and Corozal, was incorporated into ZEDE “Prospera”;

Whereas, on April 21, 2022, following months of national protest, the newly elected Honduran Congress voted to unanimously repeal the ZEDE law but has yet to ratify the repeal of a ZEDE-related constitutional provision;

Whereas ZEDEs remain an existential threat to the Garífuna people, as the “Prospera” ZEDE on the island of Roatan continues to expand and as the Delaware-based company Prospera, Inc., pursues an abusive $11,000,000,000 lawsuit against the state of Honduras challenging the repeal of the ZEDE law under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement;

Whereas tourist complex projects such as Indura Beach Resort, Shores Plantations, Marbella, Playa Escondida, and Rosa Negra operate under a modality that resembles the ZEDE and displaces the Garífuna people;

Whereas the United States controls 15.49 percent of the Board of Directors of the World Bank and 30 percent of the Board of Directors of the IDB, and uses its voice to exert a significant degree of influence on the decisions of these institutions;

Whereas, on June 12, 2007, in response to a complaint from OFRANEH describing the potential and already consummated illegal disenfranchisement of Garífuna land rights facilitated by World Bank-supported projects, the World Bank Inspection Panel found that the safeguards provided for the project were not adequate to protect Garífuna rights to their ethnic lands, while observing that the Garífuna communities did not have a meaningful option to opt out of the project;

Whereas, on December 8, 2008, the Board of Directors of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) approved a $30,000,000 loan to the Dinant Corporation, whose supply chain includes palm oil from plantations in areas claimed by Garífuna communities, including Punta Piedra, despite publicly available information implicating the company in violent land disputes, illegal appropriation of Garífuna land, and reports of drug trafficking on land controlled by the Dinant Corporation;

Whereas, in May 2011, the IFC’s Board of Directors approved an equity and subordinated debt investment in Banco Ficohsa, which acted as a financial intermediary of the IFC to provide further financing to the Dinant Corporation following international outcry over the involvement of that company’s security forces in violence stemming from land rights disputes, and whose supply chain includes palm oil from plantations in areas claimed by Garífuna communities, including Punta Piedra and Triunfo de la Cruz;

Whereas the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation, whose holdings have been transferred to the United States International Development Finance Corporation, approved on March 17, 2014, the financing of the Jaremar palm oil corporation, whose supply chain includes palm oil from plantations in areas claimed by Garífuna communities, including Triunfo de la Cruz;

Whereas, in October 2016, in response to a complaint from OFRANEH, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman of the IFC initiated a compliance review of a tourism complex developed with land and resources from the territory of the Garífuna communities of Barra Vieja, Tornabe, San Juan Tela, and Triunfo de la Cruz, a project that attracted, and continued to seek, investment from corporations in the United States;

Whereas, on February 1, 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the rights to personal liberty, to a fair trial and to judicial protections, to freedom of thought and expression, and to personal integrity of the then-president of the Land Defense Committee of the Garífuna community of Triunfo de la Cruz and vice president of OFRANEH had been violated by his arbitrary imprisonment for a period of 6 years and 4 months;

Whereas, on October 8, 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Government of Honduras had violated the rights of the communities of Triunfo de la Cruz and Punta Piedra, and had failed to investigate acts of violence against the communities, ordering the restitution of land rights to the communities and the effective investigation of the violent deaths of 4 community members of Triunfo de la Cruz and 1 community member of Punta Piedra;

Whereas, on November 5, 2019, in a statement to a local Honduran publication, OFRANEH condemned the death of 16 Garífuna people, including 6 women, highlighting the murder of Mirna Suazo Martinez, president of the board of the Garífuna community of Masca, who was leading the defense of Masca’s rivers and territory in opposition to the construction of a hydroelectric plant, and who had made public statements describing several threats against her a few days before her murder;

Whereas, on July 18, 2020, 4 Garífuna men from Triunfo de la Cruz, including the president of the Community Development Committee who had led the community’s recent efforts to stop the illegal appropriation of Garífuna land and demanded that the Honduran Government implement the 2015 Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling, were abducted at gunpoint by men wearing uniforms bearing the logo of the DPI National Police unit and have not been located since;

Whereas, on November 11, 2020, the families of the disappeared and the Garífuna communities, outraged by the lack of investigation into the whereabouts of the victims of the July 18, 2020, forced disappearances, created the Comité Garífuna de Investigación y Búsqueda de los Desaparecidos de Triunfo de la Cruz (SUNLA), an independent commission to investigate and bring about the prosecution of the crime;

Whereas, on March 3, 2021, sisters Marianela and Jennifer Mejía Solórzano were the first to be arrested as a result of criminal proceedings brought by the Public Prosecutor’s Office against over 30 Garífuna rights defenders for alleged land theft, despite the land in question belonging to the Garífuna communities of Cristales and Río Negro;

Whereas, in a communiqué, OFRANEH stated that on August 9, 2022, the organization visited the Public Prosecutor’s Office and demanded progress in the investigation of the July 18, 2020, forced disappearances from Triunfo de la Cruz, but instead of reporting on the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the forced disappearances, the Attorney General’s office, in another episode of persecution, harassment, and criminalization, instructed the Prosecutor’s Office Against Common Crimes and the Technical Agency for Criminal Investigation (ATIC) to initiate criminal proceedings against OFRANEH’s General Coordinator Miriam Miranda, OFRANEH member Luther Castillo, and OFRANEH lawyer Edy Tabora;

Whereas, on September 19, 2023, an armed group of men entered the home of Miriam Miranda in Vallecito, Colon, in an ongoing pattern of intimidation that was utilized against Berta Cáceres right before her murder;

Whereas, on February 2, 2024, the Government of Honduras, acting through the Honduran Cabinet, decreed the creation of the High-Level Intersectoral Commission for the Compliance of the Commitments and Recommendations issued by the International Human Rights Protection Systems (Commission), with the objective of ensuring the rights of Garífuna communities to their collective property, judicial protection and guarantees, right to life, and all other human rights protections; and

Whereas, on March 9, 2024, a group of defenders of the Triunfo de la Cruz community who carried out a peaceful march to demand compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgment in favor of their community faced intimidation by third parties who illegally occupy Garífuna territories: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives—

(1) condemns the violence against Garífuna communities, specifically against Garífuna land rights defenders;

(2) calls for the Comité Garífuna de Investigación y Búsqueda de los Desaparecidos de Triunfo de la Cruz’s (SUNLA) full participation in the investigation into the whereabouts of Sneider Centeno, Milton Joel Martinez, Suami Aparicio, and Gerardo Trochez, and the prosecution of those responsible for their disappearance;

(3) calls for the creation of an effective and independent office for a Special Prosecutor for Enforced Disappearances in Honduras;

(4) condemns the illegal separation of Garífuna communities from their legitimate land rights;

(5) calls for the swift and full implementation of the October 8, 2015, ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that obliges the Government of Honduras to restore land rights to the communities of Triunfo de la Cruz and Punta Piedra, and to investigate the murder of 5 members of both communities;

(6) strongly disapproves of the decisions of multilateral development banks that finance projects that contribute to the extinction of the legitimate land rights of Garífuna communities and finance security forces involved in serious human rights violations;

(7) is concerned that United States bilateral assistance to Honduras may jeopardize or otherwise contribute to the violation of the fundamental rights of Garífuna communities;

(8) urges the Government of Honduras to—

(A) fully and immediately comply with the 2015 judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights restoring land rights to the communities of Triunfo de la Cruz and Punta Piedra and investigating the murders of 5 members of both communities, including by fully implementing the International Human Rights Protection Systems (Commission);

(B) grant SUNLA formal status in the investigation of the forced disappearance of Sneider Centeno and 3 other Garífuna men from Triunfo de la Cruz; and

(C) establish a Special Prosecutor for Enforced Disappearances within the Prosecutor’s Office;

(9) requests the institutions of the World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank to—

(A) immediately suspend funding for any project that may contribute to violence against Garífuna communities or violations of their human rights and consult with the affected communities on possible corrective measures;

(B) identify measures that the institutions could implement to promote compliance with the 2015 judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, acting on the measures only after full consultation with and consent of the legitimate authorities of the Garífuna communities;

(C) undertake a comprehensive and independent review of the projects that any such institution has supported over the past 25 years that have an impact on the land rights of Indigenous communities or have otherwise contributed to human rights violations in Honduras, and publish a report with their findings;

(D) carefully review their loan portfolios, and the structure for on-the-ground implementation of those projects, in order to identify funding that may benefit government agencies implicated in human rights violations, violence, and dispossession directed against Indigenous communities in Honduras; and

(E) ensure compliance with the provisions of the International Labour Organization Convention 169 regarding prior consultation before the approval of projects that affect the communities, and the completion of the respective environmental impact studies for each project; and

(10) urges the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, to—

(A) engage at the highest level with the Government of Honduras, and maintain close coordination with international allies and multilateral organizations with influence in Honduras, to promote compliance with the resolutions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in particular the 2015 judgments to restore the rights of the Garífuna communities of Triunfo de la Cruz and Punta Piedra;

(B) alert United States-based companies and other investors in Honduras to the risks and potential liabilities associated with investing in lands whose rights may have been illegitimately severed from Indigenous communities; and

(C) use its vote and voice within multilateral development banks to oppose any loans or technical assistance projects that may threaten the rights of Garífuna communities, and to advocate for reparations for communities affected by multilateral development bank financing that have contributed to human rights violations, in accordance with international standards for reparations.

Resolution to End the Monroe Doctrine

February 10, 2026

Velázquez and Ramirez Lead Colleagues in Introducing Resolution Calling for an End to the Monroe Doctrine

Washington, D.C. - Today, Rep. Nydia Velazquez (D-NY) and Rep. Delia Ramirez (D-IL) introduced the New Good Neighbor Act, calling for the annulment of the Monroe Doctrine and the establishment of a "New Good Neighbor" policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The resolution comes in direct response to the Trump administration's aggressive interventionism across the hemisphere under what they've dubbed the "Donroe Doctrine."

“This administration's aggressive stance toward Latin America makes this resolution critical," said Congresswoman Nydia M. Velázquez. "Their 'Donroe Doctrine' is simply a more grotesque version of the interventionist policies that have failed us for two centuries. The United States and Latin America face shared challenges in drug trafficking, migration, and climate change. We can only solve these through real partnership, not coercion. We need to finally leave the Monroe Doctrine behind and pursue a foreign policy grounded in mutual respect and shared prosperity.”

“For more than 200 years, the United States has used the Monroe Doctrine to justify a paternalistic, damaging approach to relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. As a result, the legacy of our nation’s foreign policy in those regions is political instability, deep poverty, extreme migration, and colonialism. It is well past time we change our approach,” said Congresswoman Delia C. Ramirez. “We must recognize our interconnectedness and admit that the Monroe Doctrine undermines the partnership needed to confront the complex challenges of this century. We must become better neighbors. That is why I am proud to join Congresswoman Nydia Velázquez to develop an approach to foreign policy that advances our collective interests and builds a stronger coalition throughout the Americas and the rest of the world.”


The resolution responds to recent Trump administration actions including the illegal military operation in Venezuela, President Trump's claims over Venezuelan oil reserves, and the pardon of convicted drug trafficker and former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández.

In addition to Velázquez and Ramirez, the resolution is cosponsored by Reps. Henry "Hank" Johnson (D-GA), Jesús "Chuy" García (D-IL), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Yvette Clarke (D-NY), Summer Lee (D-PA), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), Greg Casar (D-TX), Adelita Grijalva (D-AZ), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Sylvia García (D-TX), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Jonathan Jackson (D-IL), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), and Lateefah Simon (D-CA).

From the invasion of Puerto Rico in 1898 to U.S. support for coups and dictatorships in Latin America throughout the 20th century, the resolution details the harmful effects of the policy over the past 200 years.

The resolution calls for:

  1. The Department of State to formally confirm that the Monroe Doctrine is no longer a part of United States policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean.

  2. The Federal Government to develop a ‘‘New Good Neighbor’’ policy in place of the Monroe Doctrine.

  3. Developing a new approach to promoting economic development.

  4. The termination of all unilateral economic sanctions imposed through Executive orders, and working with Congress to terminate all unilateral sanctions, such as the Cuba embargo, mandated by law.

  5. New legislation to trigger the suspension of assistance to a government whenever there is an extraconstitutional transfer of power.

  6. Prompt declassification of all United States Government archives that relate to past coups d’états, dictatorships, and periods in the history of Latin American and Caribbean countries characterized by a high rate of human rights crimes perpetrated by security forces.

  7. Collaboration with Latin American and Caribbean governments on a far-reaching reform to the Organization of American States.

  8. Supporting democratic reforms to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and other international financial institutions.


Alex Main, Director of International Policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research: “President Trump is waging a new offensive against Latin America and the Caribbean— conducting illegal and unprovoked military attacks and extrajudicial killings and brazenly intervening in other countries’ domestic affairs in an undisguised effort to exert control over the region’s resources and politics. But while Trump’s actions are especially egregious, they are just the latest chapter of a centuries-old story of US military political and economic interference that has subverted democracy and fueled instability and human rights crimes across the hemisphere. It is in the interest of the US to reject this doctrine of unilateral domination and chart a new course for US-Latin American relations — to treat our Latin American siblings as vecinos, not vassals.”

Colleen Moore, Director of Peace With Justice at The United Methodist Church — General Board of Church and Society: “The Board of Church and Society of The United Methodist Church (UMC) rejects the use of war as an instrument of foreign policy and repents for the Church’s involvement in colonialism and neocolonialism. As followers of Jesus Christ and our official UMC Social Principles, we unequivocally reject any militarized ideology that deepens political instability anywhere in the world. Church and Society welcomes the reintroduction of this resolution from Congresswoman Velázquez that outlines a U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America based in diplomacy, rule of law, and cooperation."

Cavan Kharrazian, Senior Policy Advisor at Demand Progress: “President Trump’s recent unauthorized military interventions and continued threats in the Western Hemisphere make clear that the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine still shapes U.S. foreign policy in harmful ways. We commend the cosponsors of this resolution for confronting that history and advancing a new framework for U.S. engagement in the region grounded in mutual respect, sovereignty, and cooperation rather than coercion or threats.”

George Escobar, Executive Director of We are CASA: "For many of our community, the long history of US intervention is a deeply personal experience. Our members have family, loved ones, and roots in the region that continues to be a target of military intervention and forced regime change. The US's foreign policy in Latin America continues to undermine sovereignty, self-determination, and the rule of law, while placing lives at serious risk. As people are forcibly displaced from their homes due to violence and instability, they come to the US seeking safety for themselves and their families. They now face the risk of being sent back to the very same dangerous conditions created by the US, as the current administration attacks humanitarian programs, such as the cancellation of Temporary Protected Status. It is well beyond the moment for the US to turn away from the doctrine of violence and look towards building a better future together with Latin America.” 

DEA Drug War in Honduras & Ahuas Case- DOJ & DOS Internal Investigations

May 24, 2017

DOJ OIG and State OIG Release Joint Report on Responses by DEA and State Department to Three Deadly Force Incidents in Honduras

Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz and Department of State (State) Inspector General Steve A. Linick announced today the release of a report examining the responses of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and State to three drug interdiction missions in Honduras that resulted in deaths and injuries. The three missions, which took place on May 11, June 23, and July 3, 2012, were conducted jointly by the State Department, DEA, and the Government of Honduras (GOH) pursuant to a program known as “Operation Anvil.”

In the May 11 incident, three U.S. and Honduran law enforcement officers aboard a disabled canoe-like boat carrying large amounts of seized cocaine directed gunfire towards a larger passenger boat. This was followed by additional gunfire from a helicopter carrying U.S. and Honduran law enforcement officers. Four people from the passenger boat were killed, and four were injured. The incident received substantial public attention, and engendered concern among Justice Department leadership and Members of Congress, after reports surfaced that the killed and injured individuals were innocent civilians, and that officers had abused residents in a nearby village.

As described in today’s report, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) found that DEA’s insistence to Justice Department leadership and to Congress that there had been an exchange of gunfire between Honduran officers and individuals in the passenger boat was unsupported by the available evidence. Not only did the DOJ OIG find no credible evidence that individuals in the passenger boat fired first, but the available evidence, which was available to DEA at the time, places into serious question whether there was any gunfire from the passenger boat at any time.

Today’s report by the DOJ OIG and the State Department Office of Inspector General (State OIG) identifies significant issues and challenges in each of the review’s four primary areas of focus: the pre- incident planning and the rules governing the use of deadly force; the post-incident investigative and review efforts by State and DEA; the cooperation by State and DEA personnel with post-incident shooting reviews; and the accuracy of the information State and DEA provided to Congress and the public regarding the incidents. Specifically:

  • DEA did not adequately plan for Operation Anvil: DEA and Honduran personnel who participated in the operation had unclear understandings of what each other’s deadly force policies permitted, and the plan for responding to critical incidents was almost nonexistent. These deficiencies had several negative consequences for the operation, including confusion and disagreements between DEA, State, and GOH officials over investigative jurisdiction and information sharing following each of the shooting incidents.

  • DEA’s role in the operation was not solely supportive or advisory, as DEA officials had represented. After the events of May 11, DEA consistently maintained in information provided to DOJ leadership, Congress, and the public that the Hondurans led and executed the operation, and that DEA acted solely in a support role as mentors and advisors. DOJ OIG concluded this was inaccurate and that DEA personnel maintained substantial control over the conduct of the operation.

  • DEA’s post-incident review of the May 11 incident was significantly flawed. DEA’s post- shooting incident procedures and decision-making failed to ensure that DEA initiated a timely internal review and thoroughly investigated the May 11 incident. In the immediate aftermath of the May 11 incident, senior DEA officials decided against conducting a formal shooting review because no DEA agent fired a weapon and because the Hondurans who fired were foreign law enforcement officers. Weeks later, after allegations of civilian deaths were reported publicly and pressure had mounted from DOJ leadership and Congressional inquiries, DEA changed its position, but the DOJ OIG found that the resulting DEA investigation was little more than a paper exercise.  DEA’s post-incident reviews of the June 23 and July 3 shootings were more thorough, though certain inadequacies remained.

  • DEA inappropriately and unjustifiably withheld information from the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras.  Despite the Ambassador’s repeated requests for information about the three deadly force incidents, DEA Headquarters instructed its personnel not to provide information about the incidents to those outside DEA, including the Ambassador, during the pendency of DEA’s own shooting reviews.  After the reviews were completed, DEA provided the Ambassador with only summaries of DEA’s findings.  By failing and refusing to provide the Ambassador with the information she requested about an operation she herself had personally authorized, DEA failed to comply with the authority granted to the Ambassador as Chief of Mission to Honduras.

  • State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) failed to comply with, and undermined, the Ambassador’s Chief of Mission authority. After DEA failed to comply with the Ambassador’s requests for information, senior INL officials repeatedly refused to support the investigations the Ambassador authorized into the three deadly force incidents or to comply with the investigator’s requests for access to relevant evidence and witnesses. 

  • DEA provided inaccurate and incomplete information to DOJ leadership and Congress. DEA’s failure to conduct a thorough post-incident investigation resulted in DEA making several factual representations to the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and Congress that were inaccurate, incomplete, or based upon unreliable and insufficient information. The inaccurate representations included DEA’s insistence that drug traffickers, or people working for drug traffickers, had initiated the shooting incident with the U.S. and Honduran law enforcement officers on May 11, which the DOJ OIG concluded was unsupported by any credible evidence. The review also found that DEA officials described information favorable to DEA’s positions while omitting unfavorable information, such as video evidence of Honduran law enforcement officers shooting at people who had fallen or jumped into the water.

  • State provided inaccurate and incomplete information to Congress and the public. In statements made to Congress and the public, State officials represented that Operation Anvil was a “Honduran-led” operation, which these officials knew to be inconsistent with how the operation actually proceeded. In addition, State officials never informed Congress of an investigation conducted by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security into the May 11 incident, despite numerous questions from Congress about whether the United States would conduct an investigation of the deadly force incident.

Today’s report makes eight recommendations. Seven recommendations are directed to DEA to improve deficiencies identified in its post-shooting incident procedures and protocols and pre-operational planning.  DEA agreed with all seven of these recommendations.  The remaining recommendation is for the Deputy Attorney General to determine whether revisions to post-shooting incident procedures should be made across DOJ law enforcement components to ensure that shooting incidents similar to those that occurred during Operation Anvil are handled in a consistent and appropriate manner.  The Office of the Deputy Attorney General agreed with the recommendation.

A note about the DOJ OIG’s access to information necessary to this review: During 2014 and early 2015 DEA failed to timely produce numerous responsive e-mails of certain senior DEA officials connected to Operation Anvil, without justification.  Some of those e-mails were not produced for as much as 11 months. DEA also initially failed to produce during this period certain highly relevant reports and statements related to specific issues of our review.  These delayed productions necessitated additional interviews with witnesses and caused an entirely avoidable delay in the production of this report.  We note that DEA’s current leadership has taken action since mid-2015 to ensure that the DOJ OIG receives timely access to information.

Report: Today’s report is available on the websites of both the DOJ OIG and the State OIG, and at the following link: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/o1702.pdf.

Video and Pictures: To accompany today’s report, the DOJ OIG has released a 3-minute video featuring Inspector General Horowitz, as well as several downloadable pictures from the report. The video (with a transcript) and downloadable pictures are available at https://oig.justice.gov/multimedia/.