2026 Honduras Delegation Information

In 2023, the U.S. Border Patrol encountered more than 447,000 foreign nationals from the “Northern Triangle countries” (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) crossing the U.S. southwestern border. Of that total, 181,000 were Honduran. The policies within the U.S. to address migrants in the U.S. or at the border are largely seen as domestic issues, however, efforts to address the push factors or the root causes of migration from the three Central American countries are largely not discussed or presented in a manner that simply promote more of the same U.S. policy that is believed to have been driving migration in the first place 

The root causes of migration are complex and include socio-economic factors, natural disasters, security conditions, land dispossession, exploitation, and governance. However, in Honduras like in other parts of the world, the U.S. has failed to critically examine its own current and historical role in driving migration.

We will be attending a large gathering in La Esperanza, Intibuca to commemorate the ten year anniversary of Berta Cáceres’ assassination or ‘siembra’ (planting) as Hondurans often say. When Caceres was murdered, she was involved in efforts to oppose the construction of a hydro-electric dam project in Indigenous territories in the area known as Rio Blanco, Intibuca. Her murder is emblematic of the violence, threats, and criminalization faced by land, environmental and human rights defenders, and the powerful interest behind large-scale development projects in Honduras and the Central American region more broadly. 

Honduras is known for being one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a land and environmental defender. One of the principal reasons for this is because defenders speak out against powerful interests and figures including large-landowners, the historical wealthy Honduran elite made up of approximately 10-12 families, organized criminal groups, and corrupt security forces. Often many of these actors receive support or are tied to foreign, including U.S. companies and the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa. 

On September 14, 2024, Juan Antonio López, a national leader, land and water defender, religious figure, and elected town council member in Tocoa, was assassinated in Tocoa, Colón after leaving church with his family. López had previously been criminalized and continued to receive serious threats against his life for leading a years-long opposition campaign to a mega-project involving mining, energy generation and iron ore pelletizing plant inside the Carlos Escaleras National Park. The project is funded and owned by Honduran businessman Lenir Pérez, who has strong ties to the Honduran military and the U.S. steel company, Nucor Corporation. Juan, like Indigenous activist Berta Cáceres, the four disappeared Garifuna leaders from Triunfo de la Cruz, hundreds of small farmers in the Aguan Valley, and others, denounced the risk they faced and received little to no response from the Honduran government and judiciary. 

Land conflict is a long-standing issue in Honduras dating as far back as the dominant presence of the U.S. banana companies that occupied some of Honduras’ most fertile lands and used their influence to maintain policies favorable to their interests (hence the term ‘banana republic’ that is often used to describe Honduras). Today, particularly along the north coast, a lot of Honduras’ arable land remains in the hands of large landowners that grow export or monoculture crops including bananas, coffee, sugarcane, citrus fruits, and African palm. In Indigenous and Afro-Indigenous Garifuna communities, ancestral titles and ancestral use of lands are undermined by pro-privatization policies that seek to destroy or reduce collectively-owned land into individual land plots or systematically reduce ancestral titles using land reform programs (many funded by the World Bank). Additionally, the Garifuna along the Caribbean coast are affected by the global drug trade, global tourist industry, and agro-business. 

The former Castro administration (2022-2026)  formed a Truth Commission to investigate the land-related human rights abuses and historical land conflicts in the Aguan Valley, and on a national level, the Commission for Agrarian Security and Access to Land that has been criticized by both progressive and conservative forces in the country that remain skeptical of its aim. The Honduran government has also formed a Commission with the Black Fraternal Organization of Honduras (OFRANEH) to discuss the implementation of important international court sentences from the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding Garifuna land rights in Tela Bay and the community of Punta Piedra. 

The new Trump-backed government of Nasry “Tito” Asfura took power less than one month ago in late January 2026 and is expected to return to the repressive, extractive model that exacerbates land conflicts in the country.

Historically in Honduras, a strong government response to tackle crime is a popular political decision largely because impunity and organized crime in the form of street gangs and criminal groups remain a serious driver of violence and frustration. This decision has been criticized by human rights organizations for violating the rights of citizens and conservative fractions for being ineffective. Parallels have been made with neighboring El Salvador and President Bukele’s anti-crime efforts, but they should not be equated in scope. It is without a doubt that the same security forces sent to the streets to lead these efforts are in fact tied to the same criminal structures they claim to be fighting against. It is, however, worth mentioning that the homicide rate in 2023 was the lowest (34.5%) it’s been in 20 years. 

Honduras is home to Soto Cano Air Base, the largest U.S. military base in the region and home to JTF Bravo, a joint task force operating as the U.S. Southern Command’s principal forward-operating presence in the region. In the past, the U.S. and USAID has trained, vetted and/or funded several Honduran security and investigative forces including the TIGRES, Honduran Special Forces, the Technical Agency of Criminal Investigation (ATIC), the Directorate of Police Investigation (DPI), several sectors of the Honduran military, among others. Most of these forces have been tied to human rights violations, drug trafficking and organized crime, and other serious irregularities. 

The U.S.-backed 2009 military coup in Honduras saw a dramatic increase in corruption and drug trafficking. Several high-level Honduran officials in all three branches of government are believed to have ties to drug cartels and until recently, this was largely believed to be a problem of the opposition instead of the current political party in power. The most recent drug trafficking scandal occurred a few years ago and involved a narco-video that circulated showing former President Castro’s brother-in-law and the former Secretary of the Honduran Congress, Carlos Zelaya meeting with several confessed or convicted drug traffickers. Within days of the circulation of the video and despite widespread criticism, President Castro canceled the U.S.-Honduras extradition treaty essentially ending the possibility of Hondurans facing charges of drug trafficking in U.S. courts. The new administration of President Asfura has signaled that he would renew an extradition treaty with the U.S. but this has not yet occurred. Some see Asfura’s promises as political maneuvering and unlikely to take place given that the two dominant political parties, the National and Liberal Party, have much stronger, more sophisticated ties to organized crime than the newer LIBRE party.   National and Liberal party ties with drug cartels and organized crime were  evidenced by the June 2024 sentencing of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández to 45 years in prison for drug trafficking and arms possession and use in the Southern District of New York. In that trial and others in New York, evidence of police, military, and public officials' collaborative work with drug cartels and organized criminal groups were made very clear and public. Unfortunately, U.S. President Donald Trump pardoned Hernández on December 1, 2025, partially signaling that there are no consequences - in the U.S. or Honduras- for public officials involved in organized crime and narcotics trafficking. 

In January 2020, President Hernández eliminated the Organization of American States-supported Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), ending or gutting many investigations into public corruption. Later, President Castro promised to work with the United Nations to create an international commission to address corruption and impunity, known as the CICIH named after the former CICIG in Guatemala). This turned out to be a false promise and never occurred. Current President Asfura has referred to the politically popular request for some sort of international anti-corruption body, but members of his party have made several statements against granting power to a foreign body with a mandate to investigate corruption and address impunity.

Honduras ratified the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2005 despite widespread opposition by several Honduran sectors that were concerned about labor rights, local agricultural production and food supply, corporate rights, environmental and human rights issues among others. Many of these concerns came true and CAFTA-DR is often cited as one of the causes behind the deterioration of the Honduran economy and livelihoods of Hondurans, particularly farmers. CAFTA-DR also contains an Investor-State Dispute settlement (ISDS) chapter that allows corporations to file claims against Central American governments if they feel like national policies or conditions impact their economic interest. To date, Honduras has faced 19 claims, 15 of which are active and total $14 billion. 14 claims were presented since President Xiomara Castro took power and changed policies that largely U.S. and European transnationals claims affect their current and future profits. The largest is a $10.8 billion claim presented by three U.S. companies that form part of the Próspera Group that proposes to build a private city known as a Zone of Economic Development and Employment (ZEDE) on the island of Roatán. 

Signally discontent with Investor-State Dispute mechanisms (ISDS), former President Castro announced in February 2024 that Honduras would withdraw from the World Bank-housed ISDS tribunal known as the International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (CIADI). Although this effort did not stop investors from presenting claims against Honduras using other tribunals, it was a significant step towards Honduras reclaiming its sovereignty and reducing its exposure to expensive lawsuits filed by private investors. Despite this important step, one of the first acts of the Asfura administration in early 2026 was to announce that Honduras will return to CIADI in an effort to attract foreign investment. This re-joining process is still underway. 

U.S. foreign direct investment in Honduras totalled $1.4 billion in 2022 led by manufacturing (sweatshops), nonbank holding companies, and professional, scientific, and technical services. On this delegation, we will likely hear about U.S. investments in mining, agriculture programs, tourism and ZEDEs.

One of the most concerning and recent acts of U.S. interference in Honduras was U.S. President Trump’s intervention in the general elections in November 2025. In the days leading up and following the elections, Trump announced his support for National Party candidate Nasry Asfura, and threatened any efforts in Honduras to investigate the widely criticized electoral irregularities that would undermine Asfura’s alleged victory. Additionally, Trump announced a pardon for former President Hernández, a powerful and leading figure inside the National Party. Trump’s threats and support for Asfura are believed to have swayed voters by instilling fear of both economic sanctions or tariffs, more deportations, and impacting the flow of remittances to the country. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa was one of the strongest, most vocal critics of former President Castro’s progressive government. The U.S.’s critical voice in the country often echos or joins forces with conservative sectors in the country including the Liberal and National Parties and two Honduran civil society organizations, the National Anti-Corruption Council (CNA) and the Association for a More Justice Society (ASJ), both of which receive or received in the past, significant if not a large majority of their financial support from sectors of the U.S. government. The U.S. Embassy's criticisms of the Castro government must be compared to their support for former governments, particularly under Juan Orlando Hernández, who were seen as much more supportive of U.S. interests in the country (all while Hernández was actively involved in drug trafficking).  Specific attention must be paid to the nuances of their messaging. 

For more about the U.S. opposition to key reforms that were seen as threatening U.S. investment in Honduras, under President Castro’s government, see ‘The U.S. Intervention Monitor’. 

Some U.S. Congressional offices including Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar (R-FL) along with opposition forces in Honduras compare and equate Castro’s government with Venezuela and Cuba to drum up anti-communist sentiment similar to the 1980s and messaging around the 2009 coup in Honduras. This was particularly the messaging in the years and months leading up to the 2025 general elections in Honduras. Not much detail is given as to why this comparison is being drawn, but the effect of this messaging is misleading, manipulative and aimed at protecting the status quo against any policies seen as remotely progressive.